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   Pro’s and Con’s of a reverse-auction to evaluate conservation easements.   
 
Introduction:  Governmental and non-governmental conservation entities (easement 
purchasers) and private landowners (easement sellers) are challenged to determine “just 
compensation” in conservation easement markets.  Easement purchasers desire to 
minimize costs while ensuring that selected parcels yield high environmental and other 
amenity values into the future.  Easement sellers need an expected value of compensation 
for planning purposes to decide if the compensation off-sets the expected losses from 
restrictions on land use (possible impacts on direct-uses and on lower resale land values).  
Taking the difference in the parcel’s current fair market value (FMV) of land and its’ 
FMV post-easement (encumbered) gives some idea of an appropriate level of “just 
compensation”.  Uncertainty in the future makes estimation of the post-easement value 
difficult at the time of easement purchase and necessitates an alternative means to arrive 
at a level of “just compensation”. 
 
A Program Example from NRCS:  Legislative statue instructs the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 
accept the lowest of three different compensation options provided to landowners 
interested in enrolling in the Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) and Wetlands Reserve 
Program (WRP).  These three options are: (1) an area-wide market analysis (AWMA) -- 
or in the case where there is insufficient number of sales to conduct an AWMA, a land 
appraisal of the actual property being considered for the easement; (2) a geographic area 
rate cap (GARC) calculated by NRCS; or (3) an offer by the landowner. The GARC is 
usually below the FMV and higher than the landowner offer and thus is the transaction 
value in most easement acquisitions in these programs. 
 
An alternative cost-effective option:  One possible solution to the easement selection and 
valuation problem is the use of a reverse-auction (RA) mechanism.  RAs act much the 
same as a regular English auction, but in the case of a RA, bids decline with bidding, as 
opposed to bidding ascending.  Current legislation restricts RA mechanisms in many 
commodity and conservation programs, but future Farm Bill could authorize their use in 
easement purchases and, possibly, in working land programs as well.  Past experience in 
USDA with using a bid-down mechanism in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
and in application ranking in NRCS’ Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
suggests the program savings could be significant (1).  There are other agricultural and 
non-agricultural-related examples of bidding mechanisms in the United States and 
outside its borders, including Australia and Canada (4, 5).  Recently and directly related 
to the WRP, NRCS employed a RA mechanism in a WRP pilot program in 2006 and 
2007 to select applicants and easements and determine final easement compensation (2).  
In the pilot, the easement compensation was based on a second – and final - bid offering 
by each applicant expressed as an environmental benefit index (EBI).  First, an initial EBI 
was calculated by dividing the applicant’s initial bid by their points scored on an 
environmental self assessment (ESA) of the parcel being considered for enrollment ($ 
bid/ESA Points).  All applicants’ initial EBIs were calculated and ranked from lowest to 
highest.  Each applicant is given general information on their relative EBI ranking (while 
not divulging their own or others’ actual ESA or initial bid information) and were allowed to resubmit a second bid to improve their relative ranking to be considered for 
program participation.  Offering a lower second bid was the only way that applicants 
could improve their initial EBI ranking.  Results of the pilot showed that the lower 
second bids as compared with the initial bids multiplied by the associated easement 
acreage reduced program costs by over $820,000.  This program cost reduction 
represented a 14 percent “savings” for the pilot in FY 2006 (3). 
 
Objectives of this paper:  This paper explores some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of using a RA mechanism in an easement program.  The first part of this paper explores 
some of its advantages: the main one being the RA’s ability to self-select the most 
advantageous parcels for program consideration.  Significant effort is devoted to discuss 
this core advantage because, if constructed and implemented properly, this advantage can 
produce two “by-products”:  it can, both, lower administrative costs and easement 
acquisition costs.  If realized, this could produce “program savings” that could be used 
for other purposes, such as bringing more easements into the program, increasing 
monitoring, management and evaluation of existing easements, enabling greater outreach 
efforts and personnel training and expanding a host of other easement-related activities.  
The advantages brought about by a RA mechanism in easement valuation come at a cost 
associated with its potential disadvantages.  The next section discusses some of these 
potential disadvantages, including: perceived equity problems across applicants; less 
certain information on likely easement compensation payment levels for prospective 
easement sellers (compared to present methods); and perceived higher transaction costs 
(compared to present methods); the need to develop environmental assessment tools to 
estimate the expected environmental outcomes from placing an easement on the 
prospective parcel.  The paper concludes by offering some possible solutions to these 
disadvantages and offering some insights into policy issues that may arise if a RA 
mechanism is incorporated into conservation programs, whether they are easement or 
working lands programs. 
 
Advantages:  Past experiences with a RA mechanism suggest that they can act in an 
analogous way as competitive bidding does for construction projects – if the outcome can 
be well defined, bidders can inform others on their respective ability to perform the 
needed tasks most cost-effectively and be selected accordingly.  As discussed above for 
conservation easements, the RA mechanism can assist program managers select, rank, 
and compensate prospective program participants by their ability to provide the most 
environmental benefits per dollar of easement funding expended.  This outcome does not 
necessarily produce the lowest total cost outcome for the most enrolled acreage, but does 
guarantee that the highest total environmental outcome for the amount of program 
funding available.  The bidding process, in conjunction with EBI rankings, should reject 
projects that fail to yield adequate environmental outcomes to offset their costs – 
regardless if costs are high or low – because each bid takes into account its’ associated 
expected environmental outcome.  Thus, the most important advantage of a RA 
mechanism, in implemented properly, is that it self-selects the most advantageous 
easements with respect to maximizing environmental benefits per dollar of program 
outlay.  The attributes of a RA that produce these results are described in Appendix A. The first advantage is tremendously powerful and can yield two important co-benefits: 
First, the efficiency of the RA mechanism to select, rank, and compensate program 
applicants can lead to administrative costs reductions.  Secondly, the RA mechanism, 
through its selection process to detect the most cost-effective parcels, can lower easement 
acquisition costs as compared to traditional approaches (such as the current administered 
pricing model or simple offer prices by landowners).  Program “savings” generated 
through lower administrative costs and lower financial assistance costs associated with 
easement purchases (assuming that competitive bids are lower on average than 
administrative purchase prices) effectively produces additional financial resources to 




For example, any resulting reduced program “savings” could be used to develop 
improved easement assessment tools to monitor and evaluate prospective easement 
parcels or to manage existing enrolled easement acreage.  As will be discussed below, 
program funding “savings” could be viewed as a “disadvantage” if program funding to 
area offices are based on the monetary size of easement acquisition costs and not actual 
easement acreage workloads. 
A third advantage of a RA mechanism is that results related to applicants’ eventual EBI 
can provide valuable insight into the transaction value where landowners’ willingness-to-
accept (WTA) financial compensation to provide environmental goods and services to 
society equates with society’s willingness-to-pay (WTP)
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.  Such WTA and WTP values 
give policy makers some idea of the value that producers and society place on these 
easement programs and their expected outcomes. 
In summary, the main advantage of incorporating a RA mechanism in an easement 
valuation process is greater price discovery (relative to the current method of 
administered pricing and offers) which should lead to higher quality easements, lower 
easement program administration and acquisition costs, and greater insights into a 
monetary estimate of the easement’s value to society (Table 1).  These advantages, if 
realized, should address serious concerns sometimes raised with easement payments, 
including: (1) is the easement purchaser paying too much for easements? and (2) is the 
easement purchaser attaining the highest level of benefits possible while keeping within 
its funding budget as outlined in program objectives? 
 
 
Table 1. Possible Advantages of Reverse Auction Mechanism in Easement Valuation Process. 
Advantage  Evident when: 
I.  Potential to self-select highest environmental producing parcels 
Parcels offered and enrolled in the program are 
superior environmental performing parcels.  
Compare the environmental scores of parcels selected into the 
program with scores of parcels that were not selected (total, per 
                                                 
1 RA mechanisms in easement programs could possibly work more smoothly than with working lands 
programs because producers’ EBIs in working lands programs could be much more difficult to measure 
given the range of proposed suites of practices per applicant.  In effect, each prospective participant in a 
working lands program could submit multiple “bids” for each type of conservation activity that they would 
like program personnel to consider. 
2 CES would need to be adjusted for the land’s underlying agricultural production capability and other 
factors particular to the parcel of land being offered as a candidate for program participation. acre, and per program dollar). 
II.  Potential to lower program costs 
Lower program delivery costs.  Compare average total program cost per acre in previous years with 
program cost using RA (on a similar quality and program cost 
basis). 
Lower financial assistance per easement.   Compare initial and second bid levels on enrolled acreage and their 
FA costs.  
III.  Information on participants WTA and society’s WTP for easement activities 
Easement compensation rates indicate the value 
that participants are willing to accept to place 
easements on their land and society is willing 
to pay for easement activities. 
Compare implied WTA and WTP estimates with programs with a 
RA mechanism with estimates from past studies (should support the 
claim that program results suggest that environmental benefits to 
society at-large have been cost-effective and produce valuable 
environmental outcomes). 
 
Disadvantages (and possible remedies):  There are several potential problems of RA 
mechanisms, including those related to perception and successful program operation.  
The use of RAs can be perceived by some individuals as raising significant equity 
concerns.  These individuals acknowledge that RA’s could be a viable means to increase 
program efficiency and cost, but at the expense of excluding applicants who may be 
unable to “bid down” in such a program.  This result would be evident if RAs cause 
program participation to be dominated by individuals with the “financial where-with-all” 
to lower their bids.  Related to this concern, some individuals fear that RAs could create 
“bidding wars” between neighbors competing for entry into the program.  One possible 
solution to these potential problems is to set up a number of applicant pools depending on 
their wealth status so as not to discriminate against “limited means applicants” to 
compete by bidding down.  Also, program managers could allocate additional points to 
“limited means applicants” to raise their scores (and be justified on the grounds that 
social objectives need to be included along with environmental benefits).  The possibility 
of “bidding wars” could be relieved through educational outreach to convince applicants 
that the bidding system is “not about them”, but about their parcels’ ability to generate 
expected environmental outcomes.  It should be kept in mind that “financial where-with-
all” may not be a dominant factor in cases where “limited means applicants” can offset 
any financial disadvantages with high environmental benefits. 
 
A second issue that could arise with a RA mechanism (as opposed to an administrative 
pricing system) is that program delivery could be perceived as too complicated and 
uncertain by prospective easement sellers
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.  This perception could be reduced through the 
use of transparent information technology along with out-reach efforts to educate 
landowners on the value of auctions.  The uncertainty of the eventual transaction price for 
the easement by moving to a RA mechanism as opposed to the current system is a valid 
concern for prospective easement sellers and program implementers and seems to be an 
unavoidable product of a bidding system.  Provision of historical easement purchase 
prices could relieve some of this easement compensation uncertainty.   
Success of a RA program would depend heavily on the ability to assess the expected 
environmental outcomes of each prospective easement offering and a willing set of 
                                                 
3 Actually, this problem could be a problem for easement purchasers (who have traditionally relied on 
administered pricing or an individual appraisal to assess the fair market value of the easement).   landowners competing for program acceptance.  A key advantage of the RA discussed 
above is that it judges each easement by their marginal benefit per program dollar.  
Without a sound assessment tool (and representative environmental indicators), the RA 
mechanism could be rendered useless.  One way to handle this potential problem is to 
arrange potential applicant pools that are in a fairly homogeneous habitat area.  In a fairly 
homogeneous habitat area, the assessment tool would simply need to capture the main 
differences in parcels and inform program managers of “low-hanging fruit” to consider. 
 
A potentially serious disadvantage could occur in cases where areas do not have a 
sufficiently high level of interest in the program.  In these situations, it is possible that 
every prospective easement seller could enter into the program regardless of their bid.  In 
such cases, they may perceive that they do not need to reveal their “true” WTA.  
However, it should be kept in mind that this problem would exist regardless of the pricing 
system – the current administrative pricing system or one with a RA.  In any case, the use 
of a sound assessment tool could provide easement purchasers, such as NRCS, with a 
better idea of the magnitude of potential environmental benefits that they would be 
willing to pay, given comparisons from other regions or past easement acquisitions in the 
area. 
 
The perception of RAs producing higher transaction costs could dissipate after some 
experience is gained through program implementation.  Adopting electronic trading 
schemes and other information technology systems, as applied to other auction settings, 
have shown that RAs have the potential to lower – not raise – transaction costs in most 
markets. 
  
A final issue is if program managers view lower easement administration and acquisition 
costs as a problem, and not an advantage.  Many successful conservation programs are 
judged – to some extent – by how well they are received by landowners.  Policy makers 
may view increasing funding levels over time as evidence of such acceptance.  If 
programs allocate program administration funding as a percentage of the program’s 
easement acquisition costs, RA could, in effect, lower the monies available to program 
managers to administer the program.  If “program savings” are devoted to additional 
easement purchasers, this effect could mean lower program funding to service the same 
or greater amounts of easement transactions and acreage.  In such cases, any cost savings 
penalize those interested in pursuing RAs by potentially reducing program administration 
funding – a perverse and undesirable result. 
 
In summary, there are a range of potential disadvantages of incorporating a RA 
mechanism in an easement valuation process, including raising equity and participant 
concerns; creating uncertainty in compensation for applicants; increasing the need to 
better assess expected environmental outcomes; and, dealing with possible institutional 
rigidities (Table 2).    
 
Table 2. Possible Disadvantages of Reverse Auction Mechanism in Easement Valuation Process. 
Disadvantage  Evident when:  Possible remedy 
I.  Equity-Fairness Issues 
A. Are all applicants being treated  Transactions dominated by only  Establish individual ranking pools by the same regardless of financial 
status? 
high-wealth individuals.  wealth status. 
B. Are applicants comfortable with 
bidding? 
Complaints and conflicts are 
common in trading areas. 
Education and provision of information 
on the functions of auctions. 
II.  Program Administration Issues 
A. Can the prospective easements 
be adequately assessed with respect 
to its potential environmental 
benefit? 
Inconsistent and inaccurate 
environmental assessments across 
regions and with respect to 
expectations of technical judgment. 
Development of environmental 
assessment tools that addresses 
regional-specific resource concerns and 
issues. 
B. Does the RA provide easement 
compensation certainty to 
prospective participants? 
Dissatisfaction and frustration of 
easement sellers with problems with 
planning and financing. 
May not be possible to provide a 
remedy to this short-coming. 
C. Does the RA mechanism add 
unnecessary costs to easement 
acquisitions? 
High transaction costs are 
widespread. 
Inquire about improved RA 
information platforms. 
III.  Issues related to easement purchaser internal program funding rigidities  
A. Do easement acquisition cost 
reductions due to the RA 
mechanism reduce monies available 
for technical assistance? 
Lower program funding with the 
same or more easements strain 
program administration and 
management. 
Allocate amount of technical assistance 
funding on a per-acre basis, rather than 
as a percent of easement acquisition 
costs. 
 
Conclusions and Implications:  Incorporating a RA into conservation programs may seem 
like a “no brainer” to most economists.  The economic literature suggests that the greatest 
gain from moving to programs with a RA mechanism is its ability to select, rank, and 
valuate easements according to their ability to produce the highest environmental 
outcomes for any given level of program funding.  However, policy makers and 
conservation easement program managers would be faced with significant 
implementation issues and legitimate concerns with respect to landowners’ acceptance 
and legislative intent.  Some legislative changes for many of these programs would 
probably be needed to more fully accept competitive bidding in program design.  Much 
effort would be needed to construct a suitable design of a program to deal with: the type 
of assessment tool needed and selection of environmental indicators, geographic and 
equity considerations of applicant pools (should applicant pools be smaller or larger than 
8-11 digit hydrologic units?), and possible landowners’ dissatisfaction with a “new” 
easement valuation method.  This discussion, whether RAs’ advantages outweigh its 
disadvantages or not, brings into focus the need to better assess the expected 
environmental benefits of conservation programs regardless of the compensation method 
employed.         
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   Appendix A:  Reverse Auctions in a Linear Programming Context 
 
Consider a hypothetical situation where there are 100 landowners, each having 10 acres 
of land that they would like to enroll in WRP.  The land parcels of 50 landowners have 
the potential to deliver 10 environmental benefits and the other 50 landowners with the 
potential to deliver 9 (10 percent less).  The land in the first group of landowners is 
termed “high environmental potential” or “HEP” and the latter group will be termed 
“LEP” for “low environmental potential”.  In addition, 50 landowners plan to bid $10 per 
contract and the other 50 landowners, $9 per contract (10 percent less).  The first set of 
these landowners are termed “high bidders” (“HB”) and the latter group, termed “LB”, 
“low bidders”.   Assuming two equal probability distributions for each characteristic, our 
group of landowners will break into the following groups and numbers: 25 landowners 
will be HEP/HB; 25 as HEP/LB; 25 as LEP/HB; and 25 as LEP/LB. 
 
A simple linear programming model was created with the above specifications.  The LP 
runs were made with three objective functions: (1) minimize total cost; (2) maximize 
environmental benefits by raw score; and, (3) minimize EBI score.  When the acreage 
target is set at 500 acres (only one-half of the landowners) the model must exclude some 
landowners based on (1) cost, (2) benefits and (3) a combination of the two.  Using 
criteria in (1), the model selects landowners that are low bidders, regardless of the quality 
of their land to provide environmental (Table 1).  Likewise when the objective function 
searches to maximize the total number of environmental points, it selects the highest 
yielding parcels regardless of program cost.  When the objective function is set to select 
parcels associated with lowest EBI scores, it considers both cost and environmental 
benefits (Table 3).  All solutions have an EBI value close to $0.95 per environmental 
point. The results of this simple model seem obvious, but however the model is powerful 
when the objective function is constrained by a limited number of participants or when 
the distribution of characteristics vary greatly across potential participants.  This will be 
discussed in the presentation, but just consider the results in Table 4 when the number of 
participants are constrained to 30 individuals (Table 4).  In these scenarios, the over-all 
EBI value of the optimum solution varies from $0.97, $0.94, and $0.92 per environmental 
point, respectively for the minimization of cost, maximization of total environmental 
benefits, and select participants by lowest EBI score.    
 
 
Table 3. Linear Programming Results of Equally Distributed Characteristics in Participants with non-binding 
total participant constraint in place.  






















      000s $  Points 
Minimize Cost  $450  475  25  25  0  0  50 
Maximize by raw score  $475  500  0  25  0  25  50 
Maximize by EBI score  $461.67  486.67  13.333  25  0  11.667  50 
1/ Key: LEP/LB= low environmental potential and low bidder, respectively for HEP/LB. LEP/HB, LEP/HB.  
Table 4. Linear Programming Results of Equally Distributed Characteristics in Participants with a binding 
total participant constraint in place (30).  






















      000s $  Points 
Minimize Cost  $270  277.5  22.5  7.5  0  0  30 
Maximize by raw score  $282  300  0  18.75  0  11.25  30 
Maximize by EBI score  $275  300  0  25  0  5  30 
1/ Key: LEP/LB= low environmental potential and low bidder, respectively for HEP/LB. LEP/HB, LEP/HB. 
 